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USING RACKETEERING LAWS TO
CONTROL OBSCENITY: ALEXANDER V
UNITED STATES AND THE PERVERSION
OF RICO
Our Constitution prefers to err on the side of protecting speech. It
is better to leave a few of speech's noxious branches to their luxu-
riant growth, than, by pruning them away, to injure the vigour of
those yielding the proper fruits.'
You are the owner of a local bookstore, marveling at the enormous
variety of titles you offer to your customers. You assume that you may
place virtually any book you want on the shelves, motivated only by the
dictates of the marketplace. After all, in the United States the Consti-
tution protects citizens from government censorship of the books they
read.'
What if you learned, however, that if a court determined that even
two books of the thousands of titles in your bookstore were obscene,
the Government could seize and destroy every book in your store and
every book in any other store you own? 3 What if you also learned that
you might lose nearly all of your personal assets and face a lengthy
prison term? Finally, what if you learned that the definition of obscen-
ity is so difficult to formulate, every community in the country has its
own standard?' Confused and intimidated, you remove numerous titles
from the shelves fearing that if even two books sold over a ten-year
period violated your state's obscenity laws, you could lose your entire
business and be sent to prison.
Unfortunately, this scenario is not an Orwellian nightmare; it is
the reality in the United States today. In fact, after the United States
Supreme Court's ruling in Alexander v. United States,' such a scenario
could become commonplace. In Alexander, the Court upheld the post-
trial forfeiture provisions of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act ("RICO") that mandate forfeiture of assets associ-
ated with a racketeering enterprise even in the context of an expressive
Adult Video Ass'n v. Barr, 960 F.2d 781, 792 (9th Cir. 1992), vacated sub num. Reno v, Adult
Video Ass'n, 113 S. Ct. 3028 (1993).
2 Sec Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 20 (1973).
3 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1963 (1988).
4 See Mille; 4l3 U.S. at 24.
5 See Alexander v. United States, 113 S. Ct.. 2766 (1993).
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business such as a bookstore. 5 The Court decided that RICO's forfei-
ture provisions were subsequent punishments for criminal violations
rather than unconstitutional prior restraints on speech.? The Court
conceded that RICO's strict forfeiture provisions, when applied to an
expressive business such as a bookstore, would lead to some self-cen-
sorship of constitutionally protected speech. 8 The Court concluded,
however, that this self-censorship also would occur when a defendant
faces severe prison sentences or fines.' Thus, RICO's forfeiture provi-
sions, the Court noted, would not chill constitutionally protected speech
any more than other criminal punishments and are constitutional.°
The Court also dismissed the argument that protected, non-ob-
scene assets should be spared from RICO's forfeiture provisions." The
Court reasoned that non-obscene assets are subject to forfeiture not
because of their expressive nature, but because they are related directly
to a racketeering enterprise.' 2 The Court, therefore, refused to carve
out an exception to RICO when the racketeering enterprise is a busi-
ness dealing in expressive materials.°
This Note examines the Alexander decision and argues that it was
decided wrongly. By indulging in a formalistic analysis of RICO, the
Court ignored the practical effect of the statute's forfeiture provisions
and contradicted its own First Amendment jurisprudence. Section I
provides background on RICO and its forfeiture provisions, and dis-
cusses the definition of "obscenity" and the First Amendment protec-
tion of sexually explicit expression." Section II examines the First
Amendment challenges to the federal RICO statute and its state coun-
terparts.° Section III discusses Alexander v. United States in detail.°
Finally, Section IV argues that the majority opinion's reasoning in
Alexander is flawed, and proposes a limit on the scope of RICO forfei-
tures.'
6 Id.
7 1d. at 2773.
8 Id. at 2774,
See id.
I" See Alexander, 113 S. Gt. at 2774.
" See id.
12 Id. at 2772.
13 Id. at 2770-71.
"See infra notes 18-65 and accompanying text.
15 &V infra notes 66-177 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 178-279 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 280-336 and accompanying text.
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I. THE RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS ACT
A. RICO's History and Purpose
Congress enacted the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organi-
zations Act as Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970,
seeking to combat the infiltration of organized crime into legitimate
business. 18 Congress's earlier attempts to combat organized crime had
failed, partly because traditional criminal punishments of fines and
imprisonment attack only the individuals involved in the crimes, and
not the criminal enterprise itself.' 9
 RICO represented a new approach
to the problem." RICO penalties sought to destroy the criminal enter-
prise rather than merely sanction its replaceable members. 21
To be criminally liable under RICO, the defendant must engage
in a pattern of racketeering activity. 22
 RICO defines racketeering activ-
ity as the commission of two or more predicate acts within a ten-year
period." These predicate acts are murder, kidnapping, perjury, extor-
tion, arson, robbery, bribery, gambling and narcotics trafficking." Con-
gress added the violation of both federal and state obscenity laws to
the list of predicate acts in a 1984 RICO amendment. 25 Members of
Congress justified this addition by citing the proliferation of pornog-
raphy and the involvement of organized crime in that industry." Thus,
12 Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (codified at 18
U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988)); Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2777; John J. O'Donnell, Note, RICO
Forfeiture and Obscenity: Prior Restraint or Subsequent Punishment?, 56 FoRntiam L. REv. 1101,
1104 (1988).
12 See Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2777.
20 Id.
21 See id. The legislative history reads: "What is needed here ... are new approaches that will
deal not only with individuals, but also with the economic base through which those individuals
constitute such a serious threat to the economic well-being of the Nation. In short, an attack must
be made on their source of economic power itself, and the attack must take place on all available
fronts." Id.
22 18 U.S.C. § 1962.
22
 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) ("'pattern of racketeering activity' requires at least two acts of racket-
eering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the last of which
occurred within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a
prior act of racketeering activity").
24
 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) ("'racketeering activity' means (A) any act or threat involving murder,
kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing
in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under State law and punishable by
imprisonment for more than one year"). RICO also includes a long list of predicate acts based
on federal law. See id. These predicate acts fall within the general categories of murder, kidnap-
ping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, obscenity violations and drug offenses. Id,
25 Id.; O'Donnell, supra note 18, at 1102.
26 O'Donnell, supra note 18, at 1111-12. Congress's concerns subsequently were supported
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an individual who commits two predicate acts within a ten-year period
is engaging in a racketeering enterprise and falls under the purview
of RICO.27
Once the Government establishes a pattern of racketeering activ-
ity by the commission of two predicate acts, RICO forbids the use of
income from the racketeering activity to establish an enterprise en-
gaged in interstate commerce or to conduct an enterprise engaged in
interstate commerce through racketeering activity. 28 A defendant's con-
viction under one of these provisions triggers RICO's severe penalties. 29
RICO violations carry with them the traditional penalties such as a fine,
a prison term of not more than twenty years, or both."
The controversial penalties in the statute, however, are the man-
datory forfeiture provisions, which provide that an individual convicted
of engaging in a racketeering enterprise shall forfeit three groups of
assets: any interest acquired through RICO violations; property that
gives the defendant a source of influence over a racketeering enter-
prise; and any direct or indirect proceeds obtained from racketeering
activity.'" These forfeiture provisions represent new approaches Con-
gress implemented to fight organized crime. 32 With these mandatory
forfeiture provisions, Congress empowered federal and state officials
to attack the economic base of racketeering enterprises in addition to
imposing the traditional penalties of fines and imprisonment."
RICO's forfeiture provisions are novel for more than their sever-
ity." Most criminal forfeiture provisions are in rem forfeitures." That
is, the forfeited items themselves are said to be the "guilty party" and
thus are legitimately forfeitable. 36 RICO forfeiture provisions, however,
are in personam forfeitures because they impose penalties on the guilty
individual." As a result, the list of forfeitable assets is much greater
because any of the individual's personal assets may be forfeited, as
opposed to one specific rem." For example, a job or salary can consti-
by the Attorney General's Commission on Pornography which found a substantial involvement
by organized crime in the adult entertainment industry. Id at 1112.
27 18 U.S.C. § 1961.
26 18	 § 1962.
29 18	 § 1963,
30 Id.
" Id.; see O'Donnell, supra note IS, at 1106.
32 See Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2777.
"See id.
st See id. at 2778.
36 O'Donnell, supra note 18, at 1108.
36 id.
37 See id.
as See id. at 1108-09.
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tute an in personam interest and therefore can be forfeitable under
RICO." A defendant's interest in a legitimate business used as part of
a racketeering scheme also can be forfeited under RICO.° Neither
penalty would be possible pursuant to an in rem forfeiture provision.c
Thus, RICO's forfeiture provisions are an unusually powerful tool that
allows the Government to prevent defendants from profiting from
their crimes and to sever their connection with a racketeering enter-
prise.42
 In contrast, a conviction under an obscenity or nuisance statute
would only result in the payment of a fine, a temporary closure, or an
injunction against the underlying nuisance, yet would permit the en-
terprise to continue to exist."
In sum, Congress enacted RICO as a tool to destroy racketeering
enterprises by mandating forfeiture of a wide variety of assets associ-
ated with the corrupt organization.44
 A defendant who commits two of
RICO's predicate acts becomes subject to the statute's penalties, which
include unusually severe and sweeping mandatory forfeitures.° Be-
cause those forfeitures may be pursuant to obscenity violations, one of
RICO's predicate acts, the statute implicates important First Amend-
ment concerns.°
B. The First Amendment and Obscenity
I shall not today attempt further to define [obscenity]; and perhaps
I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when
I see it. 47
The addition of obscenity to RICO's list of predicate acts impli-
cates important First Amendment issues because expressive materials
are constitutionally different from other racketeering materials, such
as drug proceeds." For example, if drug trafficking is the predicate act
for a RICO conviction and the court orders the defendant to forfeit a
yacht purchased with drug proceeds, the forfeiture does not implicate
or infringe upon the defendant's First Amendment rights.° When
35 See id. at 1109.
40 See O'Donnell, supra note 18, at 1109.
41 See id.
42 see id.
43 See Andrew,1. Melnick, Note, A "Peep" at RICO: Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana and the
Application of Anti-Racketeering Statutes to Obscenity Violations, 69 B.U. L. REV. 389, 306 (1989).
44 Alexander; 113 S. Ct, at 2777.
45 See ,supra notes 28-43 and accompanying text.
in See O'Donnell, supra note 18, at. 1123.
17Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
48 See id. at 1103; Melnick, supra note 43, at 424.
49 See Melnick, supra note 43, at 425.
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obscenity is the predicate act, however, the court may order forfeiture
of the defendant's adult bookstore and its inventory of expressive
materials." In such a case, the bookstore owner's First Amendment
rights of expression become entangled in the RICO violation. 5 ' Thus,
an understanding of the relationship between the First Amendment
and the protection of sexually explicit expression is important to un-
derstanding the First Amendment implications of RIC0. 52
Sexually explicit expression, or pornography, generally is pro-
tected by the First Amendment. 53 The Supreme Court has held, how-
ever, that obscenity, a subset of pornography, does not enjoy constitu-
tional protection.° Obscenity is a term of art used to describe that
subset of sexually explicit expression that depicts sexual activity in a
patently offensive manner and lacks serious social value.°
Formulating a precise definition of obscenity has proven difficult
for the Court. 56 The Supreme Court enunciated the current definition
in 1973, in Miller v. California. 51 In Miller, the defendant mailed five
unsolicited brochures advertising sexually explicit books to a restau-
rant in Newport Beach, California.° He was convicted of violating a
California statute regulating the sale and distribution of obscene ma-
terials." On appeal, however, the defendant challenged the California
statute on First Amendment grounds.° The Supreme Court established
that California had a legitimate interest in prohibiting the distribution
of obscene materials that likely would offend unwilling recipients. 61
The Court stated that material is obscene if (a) the average person,
applying contemporary community standards, would find that the
work appeals to the prurient interest; (b) the work depicts or describes
sexual conduct in a patently offensive way; and (c) the work lacks
serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value. 62 Any expression
5" See Ana Maria Marin, Note, RICO's Forfeiture Provision: A First Amendment Restraint on
Adult Bookstores, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 419, 426 (1988).
" See id.
52 See id.
51 See O'Donnell, supra note 18, at 1101.
54 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973).
55 See id. at 24.
56 See id. at 37. The Court quoted Justice Stewart, in jacobellis v. Ohio, who stated that in
defining obscenity, the Court was "faced with the task of trying to define what may be indefinable."
378 U.S. 184, 197 (1954) (Stewart, J., concurring).
57 See Miller, 413 U.S. at 24; Marin, supra note 50, at 431.
58 See Miller, 413 U.S. at 18.
59 See id. at 17-18.
181 See id.
61 See id. at 18-19.
62 Id. at 24.
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that satisfies this definition falls outside of the scope of First Amend-
ment protection, and thus may be regulated or even banned by state
or federal governments." Applying this standard, the Court held that
the California statute did not violate the First Amendment." Because
violations of obscenity laws, which implicitly incorporate the Miller
standard, are RICO predicate acts, the statute raises important First
Amendment issues and has been challenged on constitutional grounds.65
II. FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGES TO RICO
A free society prefers to punish the few who abuse rights of speech
after they break the law than to throttle them and all others before-
hand.66
A. Prior Restraint, Overbreadth and Chilling Effect Challenges
First Amendment challenges to RICO typically fall into three cate-
gories.67 RICO opponents argue that the statute's forfeiture provisions
impose an unconstitutional prior restraint on protected speech, are
unconstitutionally overbroad, and lead to an unconstitutional chilling
effect on protected speech." Prior restraints are government actions
that suppress speech or other expression before the expression oc-
curs.69 The First Amendment prohibits the government from restrict-
ing expression before it takes place. 7° Subsequent punishments, how-
ever, are permissible penalties imposed after a judicial determination
that one has engaged in unprotected speech. 7 ' Courts consider prior
restraints to be a more serious First Amendment infringement than
subsequent punishments because they prevent speech from even en-
tering public discourse and thus increase the chance that the govern-
ment will erroneously suppress protected speech. 72
 Furthermore, be-
cause prior restraints prevent expression before a judge determines
whether the expression merits protection, the adversarial system's pro-
tections are not present to prevent restraint of legitimate speech."
63 Miller; 413 U.S. at 36-37.
"Id.
65 See O'Donnell, supra note 18, at 1123.
66 See Melnick, supra note 43, at 418.
67 See infra notes 68-93 and accompanying text.
68 Alexander v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2766,2770 (1993).
69 See Melnick, supra note 43, at 417-18.
70 See O'Donnell, supra note 18, at 1112.
71 See id. at 1113-14.
72 See Melnick, supra note 43, at 418.
"O'Donnell, supra note 18, at 1114.
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Finally, prior restraints make analysis of the true impact of the expres-
sion impossible because it has not yet occurred. 74
 Thus, a prior restraint
prevents speech without assessing the public's reaction to that speech:75
For these reasons, there exists a strong presumption against the validity
of any prior restraint.'"
RICO's opponents use the prior restraint doctrine to attack the
statute's forfeiture provisions by arguing that those provisions require
forfeiture of expressive materials before a court has adjudged the
materials to be obscene." In other words, when the predicate act is an
obscenity violation, a court may order forfeiture of an entire expressive
business when the court has adjudged only a small portion of that
business to be obscene." Such a penalty serves as a prior restraint
because a court has ordered the forfeiture of expressive materials only
because of their association with obscene materials, not because they
have been adjudged obscene."
The overbreadth doctrine is based on the First Amendment and
invalidates a statute which because of its breadth restricts constitution-
ally protected speech, press and assembly, in addition to legitimately
proscribed expression." Under the doctrine, a statute may be invali-
dated if it is fairly capable of being applied to punish someone for
constitutionally protected speech or conduct. 8 ' The doctrine also al-
lows a party to attack a statute, not on the ground that it is unconsti-
tutional as enforced against that party, but on the ground that the
statute's application to a third party not before the court violates the
First Amendment. 82
 The extreme importance of free expression in our
society justifies an exception to the rule that the constitutionality of a
statute must be tested against the conduct of the party before the
court." Another justification for the exception is that individuals whose
activities may violate the statute will be reluctant to challenge it, and
thus draw attention to themselves and risk criminal prosecution under
the very statute they wish to challenge. 84 RICO's opponents use the
74 Id.
75 Id.
78 See Melina, supra note 43, at 418,
77 See Marin, supra note 50, at 438; O'Donnell, supra note 18, at 1112-13.
78 See Marin, supra note 50, at 926.
79 Id.
so BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1103 (Gth ed. 1990).
81 Id.
"Adult Video Ass'n v. Barr, 960 F.2(1 781, 787 (9th Cir. 1992), vacated sub non Reno v. Adult
Video Ass'n, 113 S. Ct. 3028 (1993).
" Id.
84 Id.
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overbreadth doctrine to argue that the statute's forfeiture provisions
impermissibly stifle constitutionally protected, sexually explicit speech."
They argue that because of the statute's breadth, the Government can
never use it legitimately to punish obscenity because any resulting
forfeiture would represent an unconstitutional prior restraint."
The chilling effect argument contends that a statute is invalid
because of its indirect restrictions on protected speech. 87 Its propo-
nents argue that a statute's severe penalties will induce individuals
involved in expressive businesses to censor themselves to avoid violat-
ing the law and suffering its sanctions. 88 Thus, the indirect effect of the
statute is to chill improperly First Amendment freedoms." Proponents
use the chilling effect argument against the indirect impact of RICO's
forfeiture penalties.`10 They argue that the specter of severe forfeitures
will induce individuals involved in selling sexually explicit materials to
censor themselves."' These businesses, proponents reason, will remove
expressive materials otherwise protected by the First Amendment be-
cause they fear the draconian RICO forfeiture provisions." 2 As a result,
RICO's effect is to chill the exercise of those individuals' First Amend-
ment rights, albeit indirectly."'
B. Case History Before Alexander v. United States
In 1931, the United States Supreme Court decided the seminal
case dealing with the prior restraint doctrine: Near v. Minnesota ex. rd.
Olson." In Near, the Supreme Court broadened the doctrine of prior
restraint to include not only systems that require governmental pre-ap-
proval before the dissemination of speech, but also injunctions against
future speech."5 The case involved a Minnesota statute providing for
the judicial abatement, as a public nuisance, of a "malicious, scandal-
ous and defamatory newspaper, magazine or other periodical.""" A
county attorney brought an action under the statute to enjoin the
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 See Fort Wayne Souks, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U,S. 46, 59 (1989).
88 See id.
" See id,
99 See id.
91 See id. at 60.
92 Fort Wayne Books, 489 U.S. at 60.
93 See id. at 59.
94 283 U.S. 697, 723 (1931); see Alexander v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2766, 2781 (1993).
°I' Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2773 n.2; Near, 283 U.S. at 722-23.
96 Near, 283 U.S. at 701-02.
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defendant's publication of The Saturday Press. 97 The complaint alleged
that the defendants published numerous editions of The Saturday Press
"largely devoted to malicious, scandalous and defamatory articles."98
The articles contained charges that a Jewish gangster controlled gam-
bling, bootlegging and racketeering in Minneapolis, and that law en-
forcement officials were derelict in performing their duties." The trial
court in Near forbade the defendants from publishing, circulating or
possessing any edition of The Saturday Press.m The Supreme Court,
however, determined that freedom of the press should prevent prior
restraints on publication.m The Court rejected the argument that the
Minnesota statute, which permits prior restraints, was constitutional
merely because those restraints would be lifted if a publisher could
demonstrate that the articles in question were in fact true and publish-
ed with good motives. 102 The Court therefore struck down the Minne-
sota statute as an impermissible prior restraint.'"
In 1963, in Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court
struck down, as an unconstitutional prior restraint, a statute that em-
powered a Rhode Island state commission to warn book sellers that
certain titles in their inventory might be obscene, thus implying that
criminal prosecution could follow if the sellers did not remove the
titles.'" Although the commission could not enforce its warnings, and
failure to heed them did not constitute a criminal offense, the Court
invalidated the statute as an impermissible prior administrative re-
straint.'" The Court stated that it would look through form to the
substance of the law and recognize that even informal censorship may
stifle speech sufficiently to warrant injunctive relief.'" The Court noted
that although the commission had no enforcement power, its activities
ultimately would suppress publications it determined objectionable. 197
The Court held, therefore, that even this form of informal censorship,
when evaluated by its impact on free speech, was unconstitutional.'"
97 Id. at 703.
" Id.
99 Id. at 704.
1 °° Id. at 704-05.
1 ° 1 Near, 283 U.S. at 713.
1 °2 Id. at 721.
1 °5 /4. at 722-23.
1 °4 Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 61, 68-71 (1963).
1 °5 1d. at 68, 71.
1 °6 /d. at 67.
107
 Id.
10" Id. at 71.
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In 1980, in Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., the United States
Supreme Court dealt with the issue of prior restraint in the context of
sexually explicit expression.'" Vance involved two Texas nuisance stat-
utes under which a court could enjoin indefinitely a theater's showing
of non-obscene films upon Government demonstration that obscene
films had been shown at the same theater."° In striking down the
statutes, the Supreme Court stated that regulation of communicative
activity, like films, requires more narrowly drawn procedures than
those used to abate an ordinary nuisance."' The Court reasoned that
the prior restraint authorized by the Texas statutes was more onerous
and objectionable than the threat of criminal sanctions following the
exhibition of the film. 112 In a criminal trial, the Court noted, the
defendant may argue that the film shown was not obscene." 3 This
defense is obviously not available in the case of a prior restraint author-
ized by the statutes in question."4 Thus, the Court struck down the
statutes as impermissible prior restraints." 3
The first case ruling on the validity of the federal RICO forfeiture
provisions with respect to obscenity violations was United States v. Pryba,
decided in 1990."' In Pryba, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit rejected a prior restraint and chilling effect argument
made by the defendants, who owned nine video rental stores and three
bookstores." 7 At trial, the defendants were convicted of several of-
fenses, including RICO violations, related to the sale of obscene video
tapes and magazines."' In addition to fines and jail terms for the
obscenity violations, the court ordered the defendants to forfeit their
entire interest in twelve businesses, along with corporate assets, real
estate and motor vehicles. 19 The businesses' sales during the year the
violations took place exceeded $2 million."' The total value of the
obscene materials was $105.30. 121
1119 Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308, 314-15 (1980).
no Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2771; Vance, 445 U.S. at 310 nn.1-2;
111 Vance, 445 U.S. at 315.
"2 Id. at 316.
"3 Id.
114 See id. at 516.
"5 Id.
116 900 F.2d 748, 753 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 924 (1990).
117 1d. at 750.
118 Id. The jury found six magazines and four video tapes that had been rented or purchased
to be obscene. Id.
118 Id. at 752.
120 Id. at 753.
tzt Pryba, 900 F.2d at 753.
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The defendants appealed the convictions and forfeiture orders to
the Fourth Circuit, arguing that RICO's forfeiture provisions violated
the First Amendment when the predicate acts were obscenity viola-
tions. 122 Specifically, the defendants asserted that the forfeiture provi-
sions represented an unconstitutional prior restraint and had a chilling
effect on constitutionally protected speech.' 23 Rejecting these argu-
ments, the Fourth Circuit noted the absence of constitutional protec-
tion for obscene materials and held that RICO's forfeiture provisions
did not violate the First Amendment even though some forfeited
materials may not be obscene.' 24 The Fourth Circuit determined that
the Government established a nexus between those protected materi-
als and the defendant's illegal, obscene assets.' 2• The court stated that
as long as the defendants acquired the forfeited materials in violation
of RICO, the materials may be constitutionally forfeited in accordance
with the statute's procedures.' 26 To accept the defendants' argument,
the court reasoned, would allow criminals to shelter their illegal profits
by investing them in expressive businesses like newspapers.' 27
With respect to the defendants' chilling effect argument, the court
stated that a chilling effect does not make a forfeiture unconstitu-
tional. 128 The Fourth Circuit noted that despite the chilling effect of
both large fines and prison terms, the defendants did not argue that
fines and imprisonment were unconstitutional. 129 The court reasoned
that the defendants faced thirty-five years in prison and a fine of $1.75
million even without RICO's forfeiture provisions.' 3° This penalty, the
court predicted, would destroy the defendants' business and conse-
quently chill their right to sell presumptively protected speech."' This
result, however, did not make the prison sentence and fine unconsti-
tutional.' 32 This same reasoning, the Fourth Circuit concluded, applied
to RICO's forfeiture provisions." 3
In 1992, in Adult Video Association v. Barr, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit also addressed the validity of the
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 753, 755.
125 Id. at 755.
126 pryba, 900 F.2d at 756.
127 Id. at 755 .
128 Id. at 756.
129 See id.
13° Id.
131 Nyba, 900 F.2d at 756.
132 Id.
'33
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federal RICO statute's post-trial forfeiture provisions.'" The Ninth
Circuit determined that the federal RICO statute's post-trial forfeiture
provisions did not constitute prior restraints on expression.'" Never-
theless, the court held that those provisions were unconstitutional.'"
In Barr, the Adult Video Association sought a declaration that
RICO's criminal provisions were facially unconstitutional when en-
forced against obscenity offenses." 7 Adult Video asserted that RICO's
post-trial forfeiture provisions amounted to an unconstitutional prior
restraint on speech and that RICO's severe penalties, combined with
the amorphous definition of obscenity, unconstitutionally chilled pro-
tected, sexually explicit speech.'" The court dismissed the defendant's
prior restraint argument noting that RICO forfeitures occur only after
a judicial determination of obscenity is made in a criminal trial.' 39 The
court also reasoned that the forfeitures do not permanently silence
defendants because they remain free to sell books at another loca-
tion.' 49
Although the court. would not characterize the post-trial forfeiture
provisions as prior restraints, it did conclude that the scope of RICO's
post-trial forfeiture provisions must be tailored to harmonize with the
First Amendment." The Ninth Circuit characterized RICO's forfeiture
provisions as "extremely broad" and noted the accepted doctrine that
criminal rules must be narrowly drawn when they operate in the First
Amendment area. 142 Because RICO's forfeiture provisions reached nearly
every asset remotely connected with the offense and were not limited
to assets tainted by use in the racketeering activity, the court held that
the statute's forfeiture provisions violated the First Amendment.'" The
Barrcourt then modified the forfeiture provisions to bring them within
the First Amendment.'" The court determined that the defendant's
assets relating to legitimate expressive activity, generated by parts of
the business not involved, or only marginally involved, in the racket-
134 Adult Video Ass'n v. Barr, 960 E2d 781, 783 (9th Cir. 1992), vacated sub nom. Reno v.
Adult Video Ass'n, 113 S. Ct. 3028 (1993) (case was remanded to the Ninth Circuit fiir further
consideration in light of Alexander v. United States).
135 1d. at 791.
156 1d.
131 Id. at 783.
I" Id. at 784.
139 See Barr, 960 F.2d at 784.
14° Id. at 790.
141 Id. at 788-89.
142 Id. at 790.
14 :1 1d. at 790, 792.
144 Barr, 960 F.2d at 792.
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eering activity, should not be forfeited."' The Ninth Circuit stated that
a court should not, absent exceptional circumstances, "order forfeiture
of a defendant's entire interest in an enterprise that is essentially
legitimate where he has committed relatively minor RICO [obscenity]
violations not central to the conduct of the business and resulting in
relatively little illegal gain in proportion to its size and legitimate
income."146
The Barr court noted that this modification acknowledges that in
obscenity cases, unlike traditional RICO cases, a concern for protecting
the public's rights to purchase, and the defendant's right to sell,
protected speech demands a more delicate approach to forfeitures. 147
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that forfeitures of assets derived from
murder or fraud rarely implicate the public's access to information. 18
The forfeiture of assets only loosely related to obscenity offenses,
however, harms both the defendant and the members of the public
who desire to purchase sexually explicit materials. 149
The Barr court next turned to the chilling effect argument.' 5° The
court conceded that the severe RICO penalties could induce some
self'-censorship.'" It noted, however, that deterring the sale of obscenity
is a legitimate goal of state anti-obscenity laws and that any obscenity
statute will promote some self-censorship.' 52 In sum, although the Barr
court rejected the defendant's chilling effect and prior restraint argu-
ments, it held that RICO's extremely broad forfeiture provisions vio-
lated the First Amendment.'" Accordingly, the court stated that RICO
forfeitures of expressive assets should only take place if those assets are
an important part of the racketeering enterprise.'"
While the Barr and Pryba courts dealt with the constitutionality of
the federal RICO statute, the Supreme Court in 1989, in Fort Wayne
Books v. Indiana, held that the Indiana state RICO statute, which was
nearly identical to the federal statute, contained unconstitutional pre-
trial seizure provisions. 155 In Fort Wayne Books, the defendants operated
145 Id. at 791.
196 id.
147 kJ. at 792.
148 Id.
149 Barr, 960 F.2d at 792.
15'° Id. at 786.
151 Id. at 786-87.
182 1d. at 787.
155 Id. at 791.
154 Barr, 960 F.2d at 791.
155 See 489 U.S. 46, 65 (1989); supra notes 116, 134 and accompanying text; Melnick, supra
note 43, at 389 n.4.
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several adult bookstores in Indiana.' 56 The State of Indiana filed civil
actions against the defendants alleging that they violated the state
anti-obscenity laws and thereby violated the state RICO law.' 57 A trial
court entered an order finding that probable cause existed to conclude
that Fort Wayne Books was violating the state RICO law, and ordered
an immediate seizure of the defendant's real estate, publications and
other personal property.' 58 The stores were padlocked and their con-
tents were confiscated by the State. 159 The Indiana court never set a
trial date for the RICO charges. 168
The Supreme Court rejected the defendants' argument that RICO's
forfeiture provisions lead to an unconstitutional chilling effect when
obscenity violations are the predicate acts.' 6' The Court conceded that
RICO punishments are greater than those for obscenity violations, yet
found no constitutionally significant difference between the two.' 62 The
Court also conceded that the severe RICO penalties would lead to
some self-censorship.m The Court reasoned, however, that a state may
attempt to deter obscenity and that any criminal obscenity statute
applicable to a bookseller will induce some self-censorship.' 64 The mere
assertion, therefore, of some self-censorship resulting from an anti-ob-
scenity statute, the Court concluded, is insufficient to render it uncon-
stitutional.' 65
The Supreme Court conceded that rigorous procedural safeguards
must be employed before expressive materials can be seized as ob-
scene.' 66 The Court also noted that prior to a judicial determination
of obscenity in an adversary proceeding, a state could not restrain the
showing of a film by seizing all copies of it. 1 "7 The Court held that the
pretrial seizures in this case were unconstitutional in the absence of a
judicial determination that the seized items were obscene or that RICO
violations had occurred.' 68 The Court noted that the seizure hearing
established no more than probable cause to believe that a RICO viola-
156 Fort Wayne Books, 489 U.S. at 50.
157 Id. at 50-51.
158 id,
159 Id.
10 Id. at 52.
161 Fore Wayne Books, 489 U.S. at 59.
162 Id.
169 M. at 60.
164 Id.
165 Id.
16'6 Fort Wayne Books, 489 U.S. at 62.
167 Id. at 63.
168 Id. at 65-66.
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lion had occurred.' 69 This standard of proof, the Court held, is in-
sufficient to remove books or films from circulation.'" The Court,
therefore, reversed the pretrial seizure of thousands of the defendants'
books and films. 17 '
In the four years preceding the Alexander decision, the Pryba, Barr
and Fort Wayne Books decisions provided the controlling law on state
and federal RICO forfeiture provisions.' 72 The Fourth Circuit in Pryba
upheld the validity of the federal RICO forfeiture provisions in which
obscenity violations were the predicate acts.'" The Ninth. Circuit in
Barr held RICO's post-trial forfeiture provisions unconstitutional as
applied in that case and narrowed the forfeiture provisions to harmo-
nize them with the First Amendment. 174 The Supreme Court in Fort
Wayne Books struck down a state RICO statute's pre-trial forfeiture
provisions.' 75 The Supreme Court, however, had never evaluated the
federal RICO statute's post-trial forfeiture provisions. 17C` It was to this
issue that the Court turned its attention in Alexander v. United States.'"
Ill. ALEXANDER V. UNITED STATES
In June 1993, the United States Supreme Court, in Alexander v.
United States, ruled on the constitutionality of the federal RICO stat-
ute's post-trial forfeiture provisions.'" In a five-to-four decision, the
Court upheld an Eighth Circuit ruling that RICO's post-trial forfeiture
provisions do not violate a defendant's First Amendment rights.'" The
majority opinion, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, rejected Ferris
Alexander's argument that RICO unconstitutionally criminalized non-
obscene expressive materials.'s° The majority determined that RICO's
forfeiture provisions were subsequent punishments for criminal viola-
tions and were oblivious to the expressive or non-expressive nature of
the forfeited property.' 8 '
169 Id. at 66.
170 id,
171 Fort Wayne Books, 489 U.S. at 67.
172 See id.; Barr, 960 F.2d at 92; Pryba, 900 F.2d at 753.
173 Pryba, 900 F.2d at 756.
174 Barr, 960 F.2d at 92.
175 Fort Wayne Books, 489 U.S. at 67.
176 See Melnick, supra note 43, at 391.
177 See 113 S. Ct. 2766, 2769 (1993).
179 See id. at 2776,
179 Id. The Court remanded the case for analysis of whether the forfeiture served as a cruel
and unusual punishment in violation of Alexander's Eighth Amendment rights. Id.
180 Id. at 2770-71.
931 See id. at 2772.
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Ferris Alexander was involved in the adult entertainment industry
for more than thirty years.'" His enterprise encompassed more than a
dozen stores and theaters dealing in sexually explicit materials.'" His
business included selling magazines, showing movies, and selling and
leasing video cassettes.' 84 Alexander would receive inventory shipments
at a warehouse in Minneapolis where they were wrapped in plastic,
priced, boxed and transported to his various retail outlets in Minnesota.'"
In 1989, federal authorities filed a forty-one count indictment
against Alexander, including thirty-four obscenity violations and three
RICO counts. 186 After a four-month trial, the jury determined that four
magazines and three video tapes sold in Alexander's stores were ob-
scene.'"'' The jury convicted Alexander of obscenity and RICO viola-
tions.'"
The district court sentenced Alexander to a prison term of be-
tween thirty-six and seventy-two months. 189 The court also fined Alex-
ander $100,950 and ordered him to pay the costs of his imprisonment,
his supervised release and the prosecution of the case.'" Pursuant to
RICO's forfeiture provisions, the court ordered forfeiture of Alexan-
der's interest in ten pieces of commercial real estate that afforded
Alexander a source of influence over the racketeering enterprise and
that he acquired through proceeds from the racketeering activity.' 9 '
Alexander also forfeited personal property, his interest in a wholesale
business, thirteen retail businesses that he used in the racketeering
182 Alexander v. United States, 943 F.2d 825, 827 (8th Cir. 1991), ard in part and remanded
in part, 113 S. Ct. 2766, 2776 (1993).
183 Alexander; 113 S. Ct. at 2769.
184 Alexander, 943 F.2d at 827.
L85 Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2769.
's6 ./d. The obscenity counts were the predicate acts for the RICO counts. Id. In addition to
the obscenity counts and RICO violations, Alexander was charged with conspiracy to defraud the
IRS and tax evasion. Alexander, 943 F.2d at 827 n.l. Alexander was convicted on one count of
conspiracy to defraud the United States by impeding the law -till Function of the IRS; two counts
of filing false income tax returns; three counts of violating RICO, 18 U,S.C. § 1962; twelve counts
of knowingly transporting obscene material in interstate commerce for the purpose of sale or
distribution; five counts of engaging in the business of selling or transferring obscene materials;
and one count of falsely misrepresenting a social security number for the purpose of impeding
the IRS. Id.
' 87 Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2770. The Court did not describe the content of the videos or
magazines except to note that they depicted "hard core" sexual acts. See id.
' 88 Id.
' 89 Alexander, 943 F.2d at 829.
199 Id. The court ordered Alexander to pay the costs of his imprisonment ($1,415.56 per
month), his supervised release ($96.66 per month) and the costs of prosecution ($29,737.84).
Id.
191/d.
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enterprise and $8,910,548.10 that he acquired from the racketeering
activity.'"
Alexander appealed to the Eighth Circuit arguing, inter alia, that
the district court's application of RICO forfeitures unconstitutionally
criminalized non-obscene expressive material.' 93 He argued that sexu-
ally explicit materials are not obscene until an adversarial judicial
proceeding deems them to be.'" Furthermore, Alexander argued that
a court, in an adversarial proceeding, must determine that each ex-
pressive item is obscene before that item may be forfeited.'"
The Eighth Circuit dismissed most of Alexander's arguments and
reasoned that the RICO forfeiture provisions did not violate the First
Amendment even though certain forfeited expressive materials were
not obscene and therefore would be constitutionally protected speech
in another setting.'" The court justified this holding by noting the
nexus between the defendant's illegal gains from racketeering activities
and the protected materials that he forfeited.'" Furthermore, accord-
ing to the court, the forfeitures did not occur until after the defen-
dant's conviction of criminal violations and after the Government
established that the defendant had used the proceeds from these
criminal activities to acquire the protected materials.'" The Eighth
Circuit, therefore, held that forfeiture of non-obscene expressive ma-
terials does not violate the First Amendment if forfeiture occurs sub-
sequent to a RICO violation predicated on obscenity convictions and
a determination that the forfeited materials gave the defendants a
source of influence over the racketeering enterprise.'" If RICO's pro-
cedures are followed, the court stated, the forfeiture of non-obscene
expressive materials is constitutional.'"
In a five-to-four decision, the United States Supreme Court upheld
the Eighth Circuit."' The majority opinion, written by Chief Justice
192 Id.
193
 Id. at 832.
194 Alexander, 943 F.2d at 832. Alexander stated that the Miller test for obscenity must be
applied to all material the Government seeks to restrain. Id. See supra notes 57-65 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of Miller. Alexander relied on Vance to support his argument.
Alexander, 943 F.2d at 832. See supra notes 109-15 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Vance.
195 Alexander, 943 F.2d at 832.
196 1d. at 833.
197 Id.
198 Id.
199 Id.
200 See Alexander, 943 F.2cl at 833.
2°1 Alexander, 113 S. Gt. at 2769.
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Rehnquist and joined by Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia and Thomas,
evaluated and rejected each of Alexander's First Amendment chal-
lenges to RICO. 202 The Court decided that RICO's post-trial forfeiture
provisions were valid subsequent punishments for criminal violations
and not unconstitutional prior restraints on speech."'
The Court rejected Alexander's claim that RICO's forfeiture pro-
visions, when applied to obscenity violations, constitute an unconstitu-
tional prior restraint on speech. 204 The Court dismissed the argument
that because such a forfeiture prohibits future presumptively protected
speech in retaliation for prior unprotected speech, it constitutes a prior
restraint on that protected speech.205 The Court reasoned that to ac-
cept Alexander's argument that a post-trial forfeiture resembles an
injunction enjoining future speech would destroy the important dis-
tinction between prior restraint and subsequent punishment. 206
The Court contrasted unconstitutional prior restraints with the
RICO forfeiture order that neither forbade Alexander from engaging
in expressive activity in the future, nor required him to obtain prior
approval for expressive activities. 207 Rather, according to the Court, the
forfeiture merely deprived Alexander of assets that were related to his
previous racketeering violations."' Alexander could open new adult
entertainment stores any time he liked, the Court maintained, without
being in contempt for violating a court order. 209 Thus, the forfeiture
order imposed no legal restriction on Alexander's ability to engage in
any expressive activity. 210 As a result, the Court concluded, RICO's
forfeiture provisions do not represent a form of prior restraint, but
rather serve as a subsequent punishment for the defendant's criminal
violations. 2 "
The Court noted that the Government's constitutional violation
in most prior restraint cases has been its seizure of suspected obscene
materials prior to judicial determination that they were in fact ob-
202 Id. Justice Sourer concurred in the judgment but joined part of justice Kennedy's dissent.
Id. at 2776.
2°3 See id. at 2770-71.
21H Id.
205 Id.
2116 Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2771. The Court defined a prior restraint as an administrative or
judicial order forbidding certain communications when issued in advance of the time that those
communications are to occur. Id.
207 Id.
208 Id.
200 Id.
210 M.
211 See Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2771-72.
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scene.212
 Here, however, Alexander forfeited the protected expressive
materials not because they were suspected of being obscene, but be-
cause they were directly related to his racketeering violations. 2 ' 9
 RICO,
the Court noted, mandates the forfeiture of assets because of their
financial role in the racketeering enterprise. 214
 The statute is oblivious
to the expressive or non-expressive nature of those assets. 215 The Court
also noted that the Government gave Alexander the requisite proce-
dural safeguards that had been missing in some earlier prior restraint
cases.216
 In particular, Alexander received a full criminal trial in which
the Government established beyond a reasonable doubt both that
some materials were obscene and that the other forfeited assets were
linked directly to the racketeering offenses. 2 "
Finally, the Court stated that accepting Alexander's argument
would destroy the "time honored distinction" between prior restraint
and subsequent punishment. 2 's Because the Court previously inter-
preted the First Amendment as providing greater protection from
prior restraints than from subsequent punishments, the Court stated
that it must be able to distinguish the two concepts to know what level
of constitutional protection is appropriate. 219 Therefore, the distinction
between subsequent punishments and prior restraints must be some-
what precise. 22° Accepting Alexander's argument, it stated, would make
the two concepts indistinguishable. 22 ' The Court concluded that the
212 /d.
219 Id. at 2772.
214 1d.
215 Id. The Court noted that if this were not the case, racketeers could evade forfeiture by
investing the proceeds of their crimes in businesses engaged in expressive activity. Id.
216
 Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2772. The Court discussed Fort Wayne Books in which it rejected
the pretrial seizure of expressive material based upon a finding only that probable cause existed
to believe a RICO violation had occurred. Id. The Court emphasized that the lack of prior judicial
determination that the materials were obscene or that RICO violations had occurred made the
seizures in Fart Wayne Books unconstitutional. Id.
217 Id. The Court also stated that Alexander's prior restraint argument was inconsistent with
its 1986 ruling in Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc. Id. In Arcara, the Court sustained a lower court
order, issued pursuant to a nuisance statute, that closed down an adult bookstore being used as
a place of prostitution. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 698, 707 (1986). The Court
rejected a prior restraint argument in Arcara for two.reasons, Id. at 705 n.2. First, the defendants
could sell hooks at another location. Id. Second, the closure order was not based on expressive
conduct but on the prostitution conducted on the premises. Id. The Alexander Court found that
reasoning directly applicable to Alexander and therefore concluded that the RICO forfeiture was
not a prior restraint on speech but a punishment for criminal conduct. 113 S. Ct. at 2772.
2 IH See Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2773.
219 Id.
22(l Id
221 Id.
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First Amendment prohibits neither stringent criminal penalties for
obscenity offenses nor forfeiture of expressive materials as punishment
for criminal conduct. 222
The Court also rejected Alexander's claim that RICO forfeiture
provisions are constitutionally overbroad because they are not limited
to obscene materials and the proceeds from the sale of those materi-
als.223 The Court noted that RICO does not criminalize constitutionally
protected speech and therefore materially differs from the statutes in
overbreadth cases. 224 Alexander's real complaint, the Court asserted, is
not that RICO's forfeiture provisions are overbroad, but that applying
them to expressive businesses may have an improper chilling effect on
free expression. 225 The Court conceded that RICO's stringent forfei-
ture provisions may cause some booksellers to censor themselves and
remove marginally protected materials from their shelves. 226 The Court
concluded, however, that RICO's forfeiture provisions would have no
more of a chilling effect on free expression than a prison sentence or
large fine.227 For example, each racketeering charge carries a maxi-
mum penalty of twenty years in prison, a sentence the Court maintained
would cause more self-censorship than a forfeiture. 228 Following its
determination in Fort Wayne Books that RICO's fines and prison terms
did not violate the First Amendment, the Court reasoned by extension
that the post-trial forfeiture provisions similarly were constitutiona1, 229
Alexander also argued that the Court should evaluate RICO's
forfeiture provisions differently in cases where the predicate acts are
obscenity violations:23° The Court rejected this argument, relying on
decisions holding that criminal and civil sanctions that incidentally
222 Id.
223 Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2774.
224 id.
225 ki .
228 Id. The defendant made this same argument in Fort Wayne Books and the Court rejected
it. Id.
227 a
228 Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2774.
229 Id.
298 Id. Alexander was attempting to distinguish the Court's ruling in Arcara. Id. In that case,
the Court rejected a First Amendment challenge to a court order closing an entire business that
was engaged in expressive activity as punishment for criminal conduct. Arcara, 478 U.S. at 700,
707. In Arcara, the Eric County Sheriff's Department obtained evidence of solicitation of prosti-
tution on the defendant's premises, a bookstore. Id. at 698-99. There was no issue as to whether
the materials sold by the defendants were obscene, only whether a New York Public Health Law
that defined places of prostitution as public health nuisances and provided for the closing of
such buildings for one year was valid. See id. at 699-700.
The defendants claimed that the closing of their bookstore would impermissibly interfere
with their First Amendment rights to sell books on the premises. Id. at 705. The Supreme Court
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affect First Amendment activities are subject to First Amendment scru-
tiny only in certain situations."' The Court stated that First Amend-
ment scrutiny is appropriate when expressive conduct leads to the
sanctions, or when a statute regulating non-expressive activity has the
inevitable effect of singling out those engaged in expressive activity. 232
The Court applied that standard to this case and concluded that
although the conduct that drew the legal remedy, racketeering com-
mitted through obscenity violations, is expressive, obscenity can be
regulated without violating the First Amendment. 233
 The Court, there-
fore, upheld Alexander's conviction and subsequent RICO forfeitures."'
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Blackmun, Stevens and Souter,
dissented.235
 Justice Kennedy called the majority opinion a "grave re-
pudiation of First Amendment principles."" 6
 According to Justice Ken-
nedy, bookstore owners would now need to choose carefully each item
in their inventory to avoid risk to the entire business. 237 This threat,
the dissent stated, undermines free speech and press principles essen-
tial to personal freedom. 233 Kennedy conceded that the state does not
violate the First Amendment by regulating and punishing obscenity. 239
He stated, however, that the situation is different where the destruction
of protected materials and the means for their distribution is involved.m
The fundamental defect in the majority opinion, Kennedy wrote,
is its failure to distinguish between RICO forfeitures and traditional
punishments such as jail terms and fines. 24 ' Kennedy stated that RICO
forfeiture provisions are different from traditional punishments be-
cause Congress specifically designed them to be different. 242
 He stated
rejected this argument. Id. at 707. It noted that the sexual activity occurring in this case exhibits
absolutely no element of protected expression. Id. at 705. The Arcara Court stated that the
defendants were free to sell the same materials once sold in the closed bookstore at another
location. Id. at 706 n.2.
231 Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2774-75 (citing Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota
Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)).
232 Id.
233
 Id. at 2775.
234 Id.
235 1d. at 2776 (Kennedy, j., dissenting). justice Souter concurred in the judgment but joined
part of Kennedy's dissent. Id. Although Souter agreed with the majority that RICO's forfeiture
provisions were not prior restraints, he agreed with the dissent that the First Amendment forbids
the forfeiture of expressive materials unless they have been judged obscene. Id.
236 Alrxander, I I3 S. Ct. at 2776 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
237 M.
238 Id.
239 Id, at 2777.
240 id.
241 Alexander; 113 S. Ct. at 2777 (Kennedy, j., dissenting).
242 1d.
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that RICO's forfeiture penalties are novel both because of their puni-
tive character and unprecedented sweep. 243 Traditional civil in rem
forfeiture has been limited to contraband, articles unlawfully used or,
at its broadest, proceeds from unlawful activity. 2" RICO, however, man-
dates forfeiture of the defendant's interest in, and property affording
him a source of influence over, the RICO enterprise. 245 Furthermore,
RICO originally targeted only offenses endemic to organized crime,
but Congress amended it in 1984 to include obscenity as a predicate
offense. 246 The result of adding a speech offense to a statute designed
to attack a different category of criminal conduct, Kennedy argued,
was to place any business dealing in sexually explicit material in danger
of being shut down by the Government. 247 Kennedy concluded, there-
fore, that the constitutional concerns raised by RICO's forfeiture pro-
visions differed from those raised by traditional punishments.248
The dissent criticized the majority's analysis of Alexander's prior
restraint argument. 24° Kennedy stated that Congress designed RICO's
forfeiture provisions to destroy an entire speech business, including
protected titles. 25" Thus, the provisions deprive the public of access to
lawful expression. 251 The dissent described this result as "censorship all
too real."252 Kennedy conceded the distinction between prior restraint
and subsequent punishment.2" Nevertheless, he stated that the distinc-
tion is not precise, and certainly does not support the destruction of
a speech business as punishment for past expression.254 Instead, he
argued that the Court's prior restraint cases show the adaptability of
this concept to protect against new threats to speech. 255
213 /d. at 2778,
244 ,rd.
245 Id.
2" Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2778 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
247 Id,
248 Id. The dissent questioned the majority's assertion that Fort Wayne Books and Amara
dispose of Alexander's challenge. Id. Kennedy argued that the Court in Fort Wayne Books did not
consider the implications of extensive penal forfeitures, including the destruction of protected
expressive materials, Id. The dissent further argued that although Fort Wayne Books conceded
that some self-censorship is unavoidable in obscenity regulation, the real issue in Alexanderis the
pervasive danger of government censorship. Id. This issue, Kennedy stated, was not considered
in Fort Wayne Books. Id.
249 Id. at 2779.
259 Id.
" 1 Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2779 (Kennedy, j„ dissenting).
252 1d,
253 Id,
259 Id.
255 Id.
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Kennedy also questioned the utility of the distinction.'" He sug-
gested that, in one sense, all criminal obscenity statutes are prior
restraints because they induce a book seller or speaker to exercise
caution to avoid violating the law. 257 Kennedy argued that in American
legal history the courts have extended protection from prior restraints
to invalidate government actions that, although deviating from the
classic form of prior restraint, pose many of the same dangers to First
Amendment rights. 258
The dissent stated that the Court consistently has adopted a "speech-
protective" definition of prior restraint when the Government attempts
to regulate future speech as punishment for a speaker's past speech
violations.259
 Kennedy rejected the majority's view that the definition
of prior restraint only includes those measures that impose a legal
impediment on a speaker's ability to engage in future expressive activ-
ity.26° Kennedy noted that, in the past, the Supreme Court held that
mere warnings from the Government that materials were obscene
constituted prior restraint. 26 ' If mere warnings were a prior restraint,
Kennedy reasoned, certainly physical destruction of an entire speech
business, including presumably protected materials, should also be
condemned.262
 As a result of the majority's holding, Kennedy argued,
any bookstore could be forfeited as punishment for even a single
obscenity conviction. 263
 He urged that, assuming the constitutionality
of RICO's forfeiture provisions when applied to non-speech violations,
the constitutional analysis must be different when the forfeiture is
imposed for violations of obscenity laws. 264
RICO's forfeiture provisions, Kennedy maintained, certainly were
not designed for sensitive and exacting application. 2" Instead, those
provisions have the effect of condemning and destroying books and
films not for their own content, but for the content of their owner's
prior speech.266
 Kennedy argued that the law simply does not permit
258 Alexander, 113 S. CL at 2779 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
257 Id. at 2780.
258 Id, at 2781. Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, Kennedy argues, supports this proposition. Id.
The NearCourt invalidated the statutory scheme in question because the publisher was subjected
to active governmental intervention for the control of future speech based on its past wrongs.
See id. See supra notes 94-103 for a discussion of Near
259 Alexander, 113 S. Q. at 2781-82 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
260 Id. at 2782.
261 Id. Kennedy referred to Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan as an illustration. Id.; see supra
notes 104-08.
282 Alexander, 113 S. CL at 2782 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
265 Id. at 2783.
291 1d.
269 Id.
286 Id. at 2783-84.
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the Government to restrict future speech in this way. 267 RICO's forfei-
ture provisions, the dissent concluded, provides prosecutors "not with
scalpels to excise obscene portions of an adult bookstore's inventory
but with sickles to mow down the entire undesired use." 268
The dissent argued that the majority misunderstood the funda-
mental difference between punishment imposed for speech offenses
and punishment imposed for other crimes.269 Kennedy argued that if
the Government seeks forfeiture of a bookstore because of its owner's
drug offenses, there exists little reason to speculate that the sanction
is the result of the Government's disapproval of the bookstore's con-
tents. 27° However, where the sanction is the result of previous speech
offenses, Kennedy stated, the Government not only punishes those
offenses, but also deters the speech-related business itself."' This threat
of censorship, he argued, justifies the imposition of First Amendment
protection and requires that the forfeiture of Alexander's inventory
and distribution facilities be held invalid. 272
In sum, the Alexander majority upheld RICO's post-trial forfeiture
provisions as valid subsequent punishments for criminal violations,
rather than overturning the provisions as unconstitutional prior re-
straints on speech."' The Court conceded that RICO's strict Forfeiture
provisions, when applied to an expressive business such as a sexually
explicit bookstore, would lead to some self-censorship of constitution-
ally protected speech. 274
 The Court concluded, however, that this self-
censorship also would occur when a defendant faces severe prison
sentences or fines."' RICO's forfeiture provisions, therefore, lead to
no greater a chilling effect than other criminal punishments, and are
constitutional.276
The Court also dismissed the argument that protected, non-ob-
scene assets should be spared from RICO's forfeiture provisions. 277 The
Court reasoned that non-obscene assets are subject to forfeiture not
because of their expressive nature, but because they are related directly
to a racketeering enterprise.278
 The Court, therefore, refused to carve
267 Alexander, 113 S. Ct, at 2784 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
2 68 Id.
209 Id.
270 Id.
271 Id.
272 Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2784 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
273 Id. at 2770-71.
274 Id. at 2774.
273 Id.
276 Id.
2" Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2770-71.
278 /d at 2772.
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out an exception to RICO when the racketeering enterprise is a busi-
ness dealing in expressive materials. 279
IV. THE FLAWS IN THE ALEXANDER DECISION
The majority opinion in Alexander is flawed in several fundamental
ways. By taking a formalistic approach to analyzing RICO, the Court
ignored the practical results of that statute's forfeiture provisions and,
as a result, contradicted its prior jurisprudence. The Court stated that
a RICO forfeiture order is not a prior restraint because it does not
forbid Alexander from engaging in any expressive activities in the
future, nor does it require him to obtain prior judicial approval for
any expressive activities. 280 According to the Court, the RICO forfeiture
only deprives Alexander of assets directly related to his previous rack-
eteering activity.28 ' The Court stated that because there exists no legal
impediment to Alexander's ability to open new stores, RICO forfei-
tures differ from the prior restraints in cases like Near and Vance. 282 In
Near, the trial court forbade the defendants from publishing, circulat-
ing or possessing any edition of their newspaper. 288
 The Supreme Court
struck down this order as an unconstitutional prior restraint. 2" Vance
involved two Texas nuisance statutes under which a court could enjoin
indefinitely a theater's showing of non-obscene films upon Govern-
ment demonstration that obscene films had been shown at the same
theater. 285 The Supreme Court struck down the statutes as impermissi-
ble prior restraints.286
Although it may be true that Alexander is able to start a new
business, the fact remains that the Court has restrained his future
expression through the forfeited business. 287 This result contradicts
previous Supreme Court holdings that the government may not abridge
a citizen's freedom of expression in one place "on the plea that it may
be exercised in some other place."288 The Court's jurisprudence invali-
dates the argument that RICO's forfeiture provisions cannot violate
the First Amendment simply because those provisions do not perma-
279 See id. at 2773.
280 Id, at 2771.
281 Id.
282 Alexander, 113 S. CL at 2771.
28s Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 704-05 (1931).
284 See id. at 723.
285 Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308, 309-10 nn.I-2 (1980).
286 /d. at 314.
287 See O'Donnell, supra note 18, at 1118.
288 See id.
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nently enjoin a defendant from starting a new business to replace the
forfeited one. If this argument were valid, it would lead to ludicrous
results. Taken to an extreme, the argument would allow the govern-
ment to justify banning the sale of a newspaper in a particular state
because the papers could be sold in another state. 289
Furthermore, one commentator has argued that a business owner
like Alexander is not free to conduct his business elsewhere. 29" If a
bookstore owner starts a business in a new location, the state may
consider that business as derived from the proceeds of past criminal
activity and therefore subject it to forfeiture. 29 ' Thus, the Court's rea-
soning that RICO legally does not bar Alexander from opening new
stores is flawed. In fact, it is possible that, should Alexander open a
new store, the business would be subject to forfeiture. The Supreme
Court's reasoning also is flawed because it ignores the reality that most
defendants like Alexander have forfeited nearly all of their assets and
simply do not have the resources to start a new business. Thus, the
practical effect of a RICO forfeiture is to bar permanently the defen-
dant from starting an expressive business in the future, regardless of
whether there exists a legal impediment forbidding him from doing so.
The Court also stated that RICO's forfeiture provisions are not
prior restraints because they do not consider the expressive nature of
the forfeited materials. 292 Alexander's assets were forfeited not because
they were suspected of being obscene, the Court argued, but because
they were directly related to past racketeering violations. 293 Thus, the
Court concluded, the fact that RICO does not consider the expressive
or non-expressive nature of the assets forfeited insulates it from First
Amendment attack. 294
This reasoning ignores the Court's previous decisions which hold
that prior restraints are not limited to content-based regulations. 295 A
prior restraint may exist even if it is oblivious to the content of the
speech it is restricting. 296 In Near the Supreme Court stated that the
Constitution protects citizens from prior restraints. 297 The Near Court
did not say that only prior restraints that are conscious of the speech
289 See id. at 1118 11.120.
29°Marin, supra note 50, at 442.
291 Id.
2"2 Alexander, 115 S. Ct. at 2772.
293 Id.
294 See id.
295 See Marin, supra note 50, at 442.
296
 See id.
297 Near v. Minnesota ex rel Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931).
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they restrict are unconstitutional.'" Furthermore, prior restraints are
disfavored precisely because they do not consider the content of the
expression they are suppressing. They are blanket prohibitions that
prevent expression from entering the marketplace of ideas before a
judicial determination of the content of those expressions.'" Thus, the
fact that RICO does not consider the expressive nature of forfeited
items does not immunize it from First Amendment attack.
The greatest error in the majority's reasoning is that it ignored a
fundamental tenet of First Amendment jurisprudence that the Court
should look through the form of a statute and evaluate its practical
impact on free speech.'" The Court in Alexander ignored RICO's effect
on free speech and instead followed a formalistic approach designed
to uphold its provisions. By doing so, the Court contradicted its earlier
decisions in this area. For example, the Supreme Court in Near, in
evaluating an injunction against a newspaper, stated that a court must
analyze an alleged prior restraint according to its operation and effect
upon free speech."' The Near Court "cut through mere details of
procedure" and evaluated the practical consequences of the injunction
in question."' The Alexander Court, however, refused to evaluate the
practical consequences of RICO's forfeiture provisions, and instead
relied on "mere details of procedure." For example, when the Court
argued that RICO forfeitures are not prior restraints because they
impose no legal impediment on Alexander's ability to open new busi-
nesses, it ignored RICO's operation and effect on free speech."' As
argued above, the practical consequence of RICO's forfeiture provi-
sions is to bar permanently a defendant from starting a new business
to replace the forfeited one.
In the past, the Supreme Court has followed the Near mandate
and looked beyond the mere form of a statute to evaluate its impact
on free speech.'" For example, in Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, the
Court struck down a statute, as an unconstitutional prior restraint, that
empowered a state commission to warn book sellers that certain titles
could be obscene, thus implying that criminal prosecution could follow
if the titles were not removed."' Following the Near mandate, the Court
298 See Marin, supra note 50, at 442.
2'-'9 See O'Donnell, SUPTa note 18, at 1113.
3°° See Near, 283 U.S. at 713.
901
 See id, at 708.
"2 See id. at 713.
"3 See Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2771.
3°4 See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 67 (1963).
3{/5
 Id. at 71.
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stated that it would look through form to the substance of restrictions
and recognize that even informal censorship may sufficiently inhibit
free speech to warrant injunctive relief.sm
If the Alexander Court's reasoning were applied to Bantam Books,
the Court undoubtedly would have upheld the statute. The Alexander
majority held that RICO's forfeiture provisions are not prior restraints
because they impose no legal impediment prohibiting a defendant
from opening a new business to replace the forfeited one." 7 In Bantam
Books, however, the state commission had no enforcement powers
whatsoever." It merely sent letters to bookstore owners warning them
that books in their inventory may be obscene. 3t )" Using the majority's
reasoning in Alexander, the statute in Bantam Books could never result
in an unconstitutional prior restraint because it could never impose a
legal impediment prohibiting bookstore owners from selling any book
they chose. Nevertheless, the Bantam Court considered the practical
impact of the statute and held that it violated the Constitution.
An evaluation of the practical impact of RICO's forfeiture provi-
sions on free speech leads inescapably to the conclusion that those
provisions are unconstitutional prior restraints. First, as argued above,
the typical defendant subject to a RICO forfeiture practically is pre-
cluded from operating an expressive business in the future, despite the
fact that he legally is allowed to do so. More importantly, though, the
use of obscenity as a RICO predicate act changes the effect of the
statute's forfeiture provisions. RICO forfeitures pursuant to obscenity
violations differ from other predicate act violations because of the
amorphous definition of obscenity. 31 ° The Supreme Court has encoun-
tered difficulty defining obscenity and even the current Miller defini-
tion is vague. 3" The most troublesome aspect of Miller is that it provides
for a different definition of obscenity in each community. It is the
difficulty in defining obscenity that makes its violation different from
other RICO predicate acts and leads to prior restraints.
Although the Supreme Court clearly has had difficulty defining
obscenity, a bookstore owner must do so each day to avoid selling
unprotected materials. This task is an impossibility because something
is not obscene until a court, applying the standards of the community,
so determines. Nevertheless, the bookstore owner must decide in ad-
211$ Id. at 67.
g47 Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2771.
3413 Bantam Books, 372 U.S. at 67.
"i./ Id. at 61.
q 1 ° See Melnick, supra note 43, at 432.
311 See supra note 56 in which Justice Stewart is quoted as calling obscenity "indefinable."
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vance, using a subjective standard, what might be obscene and what
might be protected speech. One presumes that individuals committing
other RICO predicate acts, like murder or drug trafficking, are rela-
tively certain that their actions are illegal. These individuals may, there-
fore, consciously avoid engaging in illegal RICO predicate activity to
avoid RICO forfeitures. Yet the inherent confusion surrounding the
definition of obscenity makes it impossible for a bookstore owner to
know if she is violating the law and thus risking her entire business. 312
The practical result of this uncertainty is that many bookstore
owners will remove any questionable titles from their inventory rather
than risk losing their entire business.''s This action is prudent given
the fact that if even a small portion of a business' inventory is obscene,
the entire business could be lost. For example, in Pryba where only
$105.30 worth of sales were obscene, the court ordered the forfeiture
of twelve businesses, with sales exceeding $2 million, and related as-
sets. 3 " In Alexander, the Court determined that only four magazines
and three video tapes, out of an enormous business, were obscene. 313
Nevertheless, Alexander forfeited his entire business, was sentenced to
jail and forfeited nearly $9 million in assets.'" Thus, the practical
impact of RICO forfeitures is to create an unconstitutional prior re-
straint on speech by forcing those in expressive businesses to censor
themselves to avoid forfeiture of their business.
The Alexander majority maintained that any strict punishment, not
just RICO forfeitures, can result in self-censorship. 317 RICO forfeitures
are different from other punishments, however, because Congress spe-
cifically designed them to attack the economic base of the business and
sever the connection between the defendant and the business. 3 ' 8 RICO
forfeitures also are different from traditional penalties because they
are mandatory, they provide for a long list of forfeitable items and they
are permanent, unlike other injunctions. For example, a typical pad-
lock order under a nuisance abatement law provides for the closure of
an adult bookstore for one year and the ban of all personal property
from the premises.319 A majority of courts have held that such orders
312 See Melnick, supra note 43, at 432.
"See id. at 432-33.
514 United States v. Pryba, 900 F.2d 748, 753 (4th Cir. 1990).
515 See Alexander, 113 S. Ck at 2770.
515 See id.
517 See id. at 2774.
318 See id. at 2778.
915 See Marin, supra note 50, at 438.
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are prior restraints. 32° RICO imposes even more severe sanctions be-
cause it permits seizure orders of indefinite duration and provides for
permanent forfeitures."' In fact, RICO forfeitures are even greater
infringements than the typical prior restraint like the one in Near.322
The defendant in Near could have had the injunction lifted if he
demonstrated that future issues of the newspaper would not be defama-
tory. In a RICO forfeiture, the defendant does not have this option
because the mandatory forfeitures take away the defendant's expres-
sive business entirely. 323 Thus, even if a defendant's future expression
would not be obscene, he has no opportunity to demonstrate this fact
because his business no longer exists. In sum, an examination of the
practical impact of RICO's forfeiture provisions leads inescapably to
the conclusion that they are unconstitutional prior restraints.
V. PROPOSED LIMIT ON THE SCOPE OF RICO FORFEITURES
The Alexander majority stated that RICO's forfeiture provisions
were not prior restraints because they rested on a nexus between the
forfeited assets and Alexander's racketeering violations. 324 The Court
stated that the forfeited assets were "directly related" to Alexander's
past racketeering activity. 325 This nexus, the Court argued, distinguished
Alexander from other prior restraint cases in which the Government
restrained expressive material prior to judicial determination that the
materials were obscene. 326 In those cases, the content of the materials
prompted their forfeiture because they were suspected of being ob-
scene.327 In Alexander, however, the content of the forfeited materials
was irrelevant."' The Court argued that the sole motive for the assets
forfeiture was their link to the racketeering enterprise." 29
It is debatable whether all of Alexander's forfeited assets were
"directly related" to his racketeering enterprise, given that four ob-
scene magazines and three obscene video tapes caused the forfeiture
of $9 million in assets. Even if this point is conceded, the Court's
argument still ignores important constitutionally suspect aspects of
3211 See id,
321 See id.
322 See O'Donnell, supra note 18, at 1117.
323 See id.
324 Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2772.
325 Id.
326 1d.
3271d.
328 id.
329 Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2772.
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RICO's forfeiture provisions. RICO specifically provides for the forfeiture
of not only those assets "directly related" to the racketeering enter-
prise, but also assets even "remotely connected with the offense."33°The
statute mandates the forfeiture of "any proceeds which the person
obtained, directly or indirectly, from racketeering activity . . . . "33I Fur-
ther exacerbating the Court's error is the fact that RICO mandates the
forfeiture of all of these assets."2 Therefore, neither courts nor prose-
cutors have discretion to spare from forfeiture those assets only re-
motely related to the racketeering violations.
Clearly, the Court has approved of Alexander's forfeitures because
it decided they were directly related to the racketeering enterprise. Yet
the Court was careful to uphold RICO's forfeiture provisions only on
the specific facts of Alexander. The Court failed to discuss how it would
rule if it found forfeited assets were related only indirectly to the
racketeering enterprise. RICO mandates that if such assets exist, they
must be forfeited. Thus, the Court did not deal with the RICO forfei-
ture provisions that pose the greatest potential threat to the Constitu-
tion. The Court passed on an opportunity to create a standard to
determine how directly related to the racketeering enterprise assets
must be to be forfeitable.
A formal nexus requirement may offer one solution. Such a re-
quirement would delineate the parameters of forfeitable assets, thus
giving meaning to the words "directly and indirectly" as contained in
RICO:333 Such a requirement also would have allowed the Court to
balance properly Congress's intent in passing RICO with concerns that
broad forfeiture provisions, pursuant to speech violations, pose special
risks that do not exist when non-speech violations are involved. The
Ninth Circuit in Barr laid out one possible nexus requirement. That
court eliminated from RICO forfeiture those assets that are uninvolved
or only marginally involved in the racketeering business.ss' The court
stated that forfeiture of assets is not appropriate when those assets are
part of an essentially legitimate business that was involved in only
minor RICO obscenity violations resulting in relatively little illegal
profit in proportion to the business' legitimate income.'s'
Under this definition, the four magazines and three video tapes
the jury found obscene in Alexander certainly would not have justified
s'1u Adult Video Ass' n v. Barr, 960 17.2(1 781, 790 (9th Cir. 1992).
ssl 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (3) (1988) (emphasis added).
332 Id. § 1963(a).
333 See id.
334 Barr, 960 F.2d at 791.
33,5 Id.
May 19951	 RICO AND OBSCENITY	 585
the forfeiture of $9 million in assets. Nor would the $105.30 of obscene
materials in Pryba justify the forfeiture of twelve businesses and other
property. RICO forfeitures, however, would still be capable of destroy-
ing criminal enterprises without destroying large, legitimate businesses
because of relatively minor obscenity violations.
The Supreme Court has left itself some flexibility to strike down
a RICO forfeiture of assets only remotely related to the racketeering
enterprise. The Court conspicuously ignored the Ninth Circuit's ruling
in Barr that provided a workable standard limiting the forfeitability of
assets only remotely related to the illegitimate business. The Alexander
Court simply stated that the forfeited assets were "directly related" to
Alexander's past racketeering violations."6 By not even addressing what
"directly related" means and by ignoring RICO's forfeiture provisions
that mandate forfeiture of assets indirectly related to the racketeering
enterprise, the Court has left the door open to challenges of RICO's
forfeiture provisions in the future.
In sum, the Supreme Court in Alexander took a formalistic ap-
proach to its analysis of RICO's forfeiture provisions and ignored the
statute's practical result. The Court failed to realize that RICO's forfei-
ture provisions are, in reality, a permanent injunction that bars defen-
dants from starting an expressive business. The fact that RICO is
oblivious to the expressive nature of the forfeited assets should not
insulate it from First Amendment scrutiny because Supreme Court
jurisprudence holds that prior restraints are not limited to content-
based regulations. Furthermore, the amorphous definition of obscen-
ity makes it virtually impossible for a bookstore owner to know when
she might run afoul of the law and thus become subject to RICO's
forfeiture provisions. Given the grave consequences of those provi-
sions, the Court in Alexander should have struck down the provisions
as unconstitutional prior restraints on speech. At the very least, the
Court should have limited the quantum of forfeitable assets by defining
how related to the racketeering enterprise the assets must be to be
eligible for forfeiture. By not doing so, the Court has left the door open
for future attacks on RICO's forfeiture provisions.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's holding in Alexander v. United States repre-
sents a significant diminution of First Amendment rights afforded to
owners of expressive businesses and the general public. By upholding
341i See Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2772.
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RICO's broad and severe post-trial forfeiture provisions, the Court has
sanctioned a wide range of potential First Amendment abuses. Entire
expressive businesses may be forfeited because of insignificant viola-
tions of poorly-defined obscenity laws. Bookstore owners, unable to
define obscenity and unwilling to risk their entire businesses, surely
will censor themselves and thus deprive the public of access to pro-
tected expression. The Court justified the forfeitures in Alexander by
asserting that the forfeited assets were "directly related" to the racket-
eering enterprise. What the Court failed to do, however, is define what
"directly related" means and to address how it would rule if it found
forfeited assets were only indirectly related to the racketeering enter-
prise. Because RICO mandates forfeiture of both categories of assets,
and because the Alexander Court carefully limited its decision to the
facts of the case, the possibility exists that a defendant could mount a
successful attack on RICO in the future.
VARTAN AZNAVOORIAN
